




The Significance of an Evolving Relationship: 







This article analyses the changing nature and level of engagement between ASEAN 
States and the global human rights mechanisms especially the Universal Periodic 
Review mechanism.  The relationship is significant for several reasons.  It provides 
valuable insights into how these States approach the interpretation and application of 
human rights as well as the extent to which they are willing to open up to external 
scrutiny of their domestic human rights record. It calls into question claims that there 
is a collective approach to human rights within ASEAN, specifically one that 
embodies Asian Values or Asia’s Different Standard on human rights. As this study 
shows, the approach of ASEAN States is far more complex, heterogeneous and 
dynamic than such claims would suggest.  Above all, by analysing the relationship 
between ASEAN States and the global human rights mechanisms, it is possible to 
place recent human rights developments in ASEAN within their broader normative 
and institutional context.   
 
KEYWORDS: ASEAN States, Asian values, Universal Periodic Review, United 
Nations human rights treaty body system, special procedures  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Any discussion of human rights within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) invariably brings to mind the Bangkok Declaration of 1993.1  Formulated in 
the lead up to the UN World Conference on Human Rights, it asserted what became 
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known as Asian Values or ‘Asia’s Different Standard’ on human rights.2 Although the 
Declaration itself was not an ASEAN document,3 the prominent role played by 
several ASEAN States in its drafting and in expounding the Asian Values it purported 
to represent4 meant that it has come to be associated closely with ASEAN. At its 
core, the Declaration stressed the significance of ‘national and regional particularities 
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds’ in the interpretation and 
application of human rights.5  Aligned to this normative framework was a robust 
rejection of external criticism of these States’ domestic human rights records 
particularly in the field of civil and political rights.6 Today, some claim that the 
collective views on human rights expressed in the Bangkok Declaration continue to 
‘remain valid and relevant’ within ASEAN.7  This assumes that at the time it was 
adopted the Bangkok Declaration embodied a collective approach to human rights 
within the region; an assumption that is far from being universally held.  More than 
that, it suggests that this approach has not evolved in the intervening 20 years 
despite significant political, economic and social developments within ASEAN states.   
The current approach of ASEAN States to human rights is clearly important, 
not only in terms of assessing the continuing relevance of the Asian Values debate8 
in Southeast Asia but also in evaluating the risks and opportunities associated with 
recent human rights developments within ASEAN.  The most important of these is 
the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) in 20129 and the 
establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
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Reference for the Establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)’ 
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8 See, for example,  Peerenboom, ‘Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates about “Values 
in Asia”’ (2003-2004) 14 Indian International and Comparative Law Review 1; Ghai, ‘Human Rights and 
Governance: The Asia Debate’ (1994) 15 Australian Yearbook of International Law 1; Muntarbhorn, ‘Asia, 
Human Rights and the New Millennium: Time for a Regional Human Rights Charter?’ (1998) 8 Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems 407; Englehart, supra n 4; Kausikan, ‘An Asian Approach to Human Rights’ 
(1995) 89 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 146; Brems, supra n 4 at 33-90; Desierto, 
‘Universalizing Core Human Rights in the “New” ASEAN: A Reassessment of Culture and Development 
Justifications Against the Global Rejection of Impunity’ (2009) Gottingen Journal of International Law 77 at 
93-107; Hom, ‘Commentary: Re-positioning human rights discourse on “Asian” perspectives’ (1996) 3 Buffalo 
Journal of International Law 209. 
9 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was adopted by the Heads of State/Government of the Member States 
of ASEAN at the 21st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 19 November 2012. It is available at: 






(AICHR) in 2009.10 Although both have been welcomed as significant milestones in 
the development of a regional human rights system, the former has been criticised 
for falling below international standards while the latter has been criticised for its 
limited mandate and consequent inability to operate as a genuine enforcement 
mechanism in the region.11  Central to any assessment of whether these normative 
and institutional developments represent a real breakthrough in the emergence of an 
effective regional human rights system or an attempt to limit the application of global 
human rights norms within Southeast Asia is an understanding of the approach of 
ASEAN States to human rights today.   
The relationship between ASEAN States and the global human rights 
mechanisms provides valuable insights into how these States approach fundamental 
issues concerning the interpretation and implementation of human rights.  It also 
provides useful insights into their willingness to undertake a range of international 
human rights commitments that can go some way towards addressing the normative 
and institutional shortcomings of the current human rights architecture within 
ASEAN.   The present article analyses this relationship, focussing primarily though 
not exclusively on the engagement of ASEAN States with the system of Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR).  It begins with a brief overview of ASEAN to identify some of 
the key human rights issues that arise at the regional level and against which one 
can assess the significance of developments at the global level.  It then proceeds to 
undertake a detailed analysis of the nature and level of engagement between 
ASEAN States and Universal Periodic Review, focussing on the dialogue it 
engendered on core human rights issues between ASEAN and non-ASEAN States 
as well as the significance of the human rights commitments undertaken by ASEAN 
States at the conclusion of the review.   
Throughout, the emphasis is on procedural issues rather than issues of 
substantive law for a number of reasons.  Any willingness on the part of ASEAN 
States to open up to greater external scrutiny marks a significant departure from one 
of the central features of the Asian Values debate, namely, the principle of national 
sovereignty over human rights and hostility to external intervention in what was 
deemed to be a State’s internal affairs.  Aside from this, Asian Values was never 
about rejecting particular human rights but about general approaches to the 
interpretation and implementation of these rights.12  External scrutiny can help 
ensure that the approach of ASEAN States to the interpretation and implementation 
of human rights remains within the permissible limits laid down in international 
human rights law.   In this respect, procedural issues are closely intertwined with 
issues of substantive law.  More generally, the actual process of engagement 
between ASEAN States and the global human rights mechanisms is significant in 
terms of helping to generate a more meaningful dialogue and a genuine consensus 
on global human rights standards.     
 
2. ASEAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW  
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ASEAN was established in 1967 with several strategic and diplomatic objectives the 
most important of which was the need to maintain peace and stability in the region.13 
Originally composed of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Singapore, its membership has expanded over the years to include Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam.  One of the distinguishing features of the 
Organisation is the remarkable diversity of its members in terms of culture, political 
systems, size, language, religion and stages of economic development.  A second 
feature is the emphasis on non-intervention, voluntarism and consensus or what has 
become known as the ‘ASEAN Way’ in terms of how the Organisation operates.14 
Taken in combination, these features help to explain the slow pace of development 
within ASEAN especially in the area of human rights.15  
However, recent institutional developments16 are giving a greater impetus to 
the emergence of a regional human rights system within ASEAN.  As the 
Organisation moves towards the creation of an ASEAN Community in 2015, it is 
envisaged that human rights will be part of one of the three pillars on which this 
Community will be based.17   Aligned to these developments is the adoption of the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD).  It has attracted considerable 
controversy.18  Aside from criticism about the lack of transparency and consultation 
during its drafting,19 most of the criticism has been directed at the actual content of 
the Declaration.  Concerns have been raised about the omission of important human 
rights such as the right to freedom of association and the incomplete descriptions of 
several rights it does contain.20 It has also been criticised for weakening guarantees 
against abuse due to the wide range of grounds on which human rights can be 
restricted as well as the omission of any reference to the test of necessity or principle 
of proportionality in assessing the validity of restrictions.21  Although attempts to 
include explicit references to Asian Values or the Bangkok Declaration were 
unsuccessful,22 the fact that the AHRD does refer to the importance of national and 
regional contexts in the interpretation and application of rights and to a balance 
                                                            
13 Beeson, Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond (2009) at 18-19. 
14 Ibid. at 22, 26 and 35; Cerna, supra n 4. 
15 See further, Aguirre and Pietropaoli, ‘Human Rights Protection the ASEAN Way: Non-Intervention and the 
Newest Regional Human Rights System’ (2012) 1 International Human Rights Law Review 276. 
16 For a brief overview, see Desierto, supra n 8 at 87-93; Beeson, supra n 13 at 25-7, 32-6; Ramcharan, 
‘ASEAN’s Human Rights Commission: Policy considerations for enhancing its capacity to protect human 
rights’ (2010) UCL Human Rights Review 199 at 207-10.  
17 Beeson, supra n 13 at 32-5. 
18 For an overview of the different assessments of the AHRD, see  Clarke, ‘The Evolving ASEAN Human 
Rights System: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration of 2012’ (2012) 11 Northwestern Journal of 
International Human Rights 1; Doyle, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the implications of recent 
South East Asian initiatives in human rights institution-building and standard-setting’ (2014)  63 International 
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19 See, ‘Joint Submission to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights on the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration by Civil Society Organizations and people’s movements participating in the Fifth 
Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights’, 22 June 2012, available at: 
www.fidh.org/en/asia/ASEAN,240/Joint-submission-to-the-ASEAN [last accessed 19 February 2015].  
20 U.S. Department of State, ‘ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights’, 20 November 2012, available at: 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200915.htm.   
21 Ibid.   
22 Petcharamesree, ‘The ASEAN Human Rights Regime: Between Asian Values and Cultural Relativism’. 
Conference on 'Beyond cultural relativism: The evolving human rights mechanism of the Association of 





between the enjoyment of rights and the performance of duties has led some to 
argue that the Declaration represents a revival of Asian Values or a cultural relativist 
approach.23  Ultimately, the AHRD can be seen as the product of the cleavages that 
currently exist within ASEAN on human rights issues24 and the enduring commitment 
of its Member States to the principles of consensus and voluntarism.   
In addition to the AHRD, three human rights mechanisms have been 
established within ASEAN in recent years.  They are the ASEAN Committee on the 
Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers,25 the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and the 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children26 and the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).27 Of these, AICHR is the most important as 
‘the overarching human rights institution in ASEAN with overall responsibility for the 
promotion and protection of human rights in ASEAN’.28  Nevertheless, it has been 
subject to considerable criticism due to its mandate, composition and manner of 
working.29 Although AICHR’s Terms of Reference stipulate that one of its purposes 
is ‘to promote and protect’ human rights, it is clear from its mandate that the 
emphasis is very much on promotional activities.30 AICHR cannot deal with individual 
human rights cases, undertake on-site visits or require the submission of individual 
State reports.31 As such, it is severely limited in its ability to undertake an effective 
monitoring and protection role within the region.  In addition to this, it is composed of 
State representatives32 rather than independent experts and must respect the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN States when performing 
its functions.33 Provision is made for AICHR’s Terms of Reference to be reviewed 
within five years34 and a review is currently underway. It is open to question whether 
it will result in any substantial augmentation of AICHR’s mandate or powers. In 
addition to the existing human rights mechanisms, proposals have been made for 
the establishment of a regional peer review mechanism or a regional Special 
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on grounds of sexual orientation during the drafting of the AHRD: Working Draft of the AHRD as of 8 January 
at 0400hrs at 3.  Copy on file with the author. It is also interesting to note that references were made to the test 
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25 See Ramcharan, supra n 16 at 223-5. 
26 See Aguirre and Pietropaoli, supra n 15 at 289-91. 
27 See Phan, ‘The Evolution Towards an ASEAN Human Rights Body’ ((2008) 1 Asia-Pacific Journal on 
Human Rights and the Law 1; Durbach, Renshaw and Byrnes, ‘”A tongue but no teeth’: The emergence of a 
regional human rights mechanism in the Asia Pacific region’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 211. 
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International Legal Materials 1165. 
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ASEAN States but these proposals were unsuccessful: see Cerna, supra 4 at 1162.  
32 AICHR Terms of Reference, supra n 28 at Article 5. 
33 Ibid. at Article 2. 





Rapporteur.  However, they have all been rejected by several ASEAN States as ‘too 
intrusive’.35 
 This brief overview highlights some of key issues concerning human rights in 
ASEAN.  Normatively, there are gaps in its existing human rights architecture, for 
example, concerning the right to freedom of association. The extent to which ASEAN 
States are willing to accept international human rights treaties which embody these 
rights can go some way to filling these gaps.  Aside from this, greater acceptance of 
international treaties can help to ensure that restrictions on human rights remain 
within permissible limits by stipulating that restrictions must be prescribed by law, are 
non-discriminatory and are necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.  In this way, it can 
guard against any weakening of the safeguards against abuse and help to address 
one of the principal concerns with the AHRD. Institutionally, the willingness of 
ASEAN States to open up to external scrutiny from intergovernmental mechanisms 
or independent experts at the global level can go some way to addressing the 
limitations on the ability of the existing ASEAN human rights mechanisms to protect 
rights at the regional level.     
 
3. ASEAN STATES AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW MECHANISM 
 
One of the most significant developments within the UN Charter-based system36 was 
the establishment in 2006 of Universal Periodic Review by virtue of which each UN 
Member State has its human rights record reviewed by the UN Human Rights 
Council every four and a half years. All ASEAN States have participated in this 
process and some37 have already undergone a second cycle of review. There are 
two aspects to this UPR process that merit consideration in the present context.38  
The first relates to the dialogue that takes place between the State subject to review 
and the other UN Member States during the review process.  The second is the level 
of acceptance of the recommendations made by individual States during UPR and 
the subsequent implementation of these recommendations. It is useful to begin by 
examining the dialogue during the UPR process with a view to ascertaining the 
approach of ASEAN States to human rights norms and assessing the nature and 
extent of any divergence between ASEAN and non-ASEAN States concerning the 
interpretation and application of these norms.  Attention then focuses on the extent 
to which ASEAN States accepted the human rights recommendations made to them 
during UPR, the type of recommendations they accepted and the potential 
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36 This is the human rights system derived from the UN Charter which applies to all UN Member States, see: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx [last accessed 19 February 2015]. 
37 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam. 
38 For information about how the process operates and to view the relevant documentation for each State, see: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx [last accessed 19 February 2015]. The review is 
based on three sets of documents (the National Report, the Compilation of UN Information and the Summary of 
Stakeholders Information). It entails an interactive dialogue in a Working Group of the Council which 
comprises all of its members and during the course of which non-member States may also participate. During 
the course of the dialogue, States can make recommendations to the State under review which the latter is free to 
accept or reject.  The Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review for the State concerned is 






significance of these recommendations in terms of the interpretation and 
implementation of human rights within Southeast Asia.   
 
B. The UPR Dialogue: Contestation or Convergence on Human Rights Norms? 
It is clear from the various exchanges that took place during the UPR dialogue that 
there are numerous differences of opinion between ASEAN States and other States 
on core human rights issues. While this might be seen as evidence of Asia’s 
Different Standard on human rights, on closer analysis the situation is more complex. 
If one looks at the nature of these differences it is possible to delineate them into 
three distinct categories.  The first category relates to matters that are either not 
regulated by international human rights law or are still in the process of being 
regulated although not to the point where it is possible to refer to the existence of 
any legally binding obligations. The second category relates more to evidential 
matters, in particular, whether the circumstances on the ground indicate that human 
rights are being violated.  The final category relates to a genuine contestation over 
the content of human rights norms.  It follows that not every difference of opinion 
reflects a conflict concerning the universality of rights or a reassertion of Asian 
Values. 
The first category includes disagreements concerning the abolition of the 
death penalty. During the course of the UPR dialogue, several ASEAN States were 
called upon to abolish or establish a moratorium on the death penalty.39  Some 
rejected these calls citing the deterrent value of the death penalty within their 
particular criminal justice systems.40 Attempts to categorize these differences as 
                                                            
39 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Brunei Darussalam, 4 January 2010, 
A/HRC/13/14 at paras 34, 47, 48 and 50 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei’); Report of the Working Group 
on the Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia, 5 October 2009, A/HRC/11/30 at paras 21, 76, 83 and 88 (‘First 
UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia’); Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia, 4 
December 2013, A/HRC/25/10 at paras 18, 22, 42 and 49 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia’); Report of 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Myanmar, 24 March 2011, A/HRC/17/9 at 20 (‘First 
UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar’); Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Singapore, 
11 July 2011, A/HRC/18/11 at paras 72 and 75  (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore’); Report of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Viet Nam,  5 October 2009, A/HRC/12/11 at paras 59, 63 
and 83 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam’); Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Thailand, 8 December 2011, A/HRC/19/8 at paras 80, 28 and 37 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on 
Thailand);  Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by 
the State under review, 14 September 2010, A/HRC/15/5/Add.1 at para 18 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Laos: 
Addendum’). 
40 First UPR: WGP Report on Laos: Addendum, ibid. at para 18; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, ibid. at 
para 55; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Viet Nam: Addendum: Views on 
conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review, 
16 September 2009, A/HRC/12/11/Add.1 at para 20 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam: Addendum’); First 
UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, ibid. at para 87. The recommendations were also rejected by Brunei: First 
UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, ibid. at para 18; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Brunei Darussalam: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and 
replies presented by the State under review, 10 September 2014, A/HRC/27/11/Add.1 at 10 (‘Second UPR: 
WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum’); Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Indonesia: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies 
presented by the State under review, 5 September 2012, A/HRC/21/7/Add.1 at para 6 (‘Second UPR: WGP 
Report on Indonesia: Addendum’); Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Thailand: 





instances of cultural relativism would be misplaced. As Viet Nam pointed out,41 there 
is currently no obligation under general international human rights law to abolish the 
death penalty.  Provided the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary manner and 
is reserved for the most serious offences,42 its imposition is compatible with global 
human rights standards. Viewed from this perspective, the position of these ASEAN 
States does not represent any challenge to the universality of human rights as no 
universal right currently exists in this area. Indeed, it is a position shared by non-
ASEAN States such as the United States.43 
At the same time, one has to acknowledge that the trend in State practice is 
towards the abolition of the death penalty and international human rights law may 
evolve in the future to reflect this trend.  It is clear that not every ASEAN State is 
opposed to the abolition of the death penalty per se.  Instead, opposition tends to be 
to calls for its immediate abolition. Malaysia and Thailand, for example, stated that 
they were willing to keep the issue open in the light of changing public opinion and to 
continue engaging and consulting with the public on the matter.44 While the value of 
these general and indeterminate commitments may be open to question, there has 
been some progress in terms of restricting the number of offences to which the death 
penalty applies.  Viet Nam, for example, has reduced the number of offences to 
which it applies and committed itself to further reductions by 2016.45 Other States 
such as Laos and Malaysia have indicated their willingness to review the offences to 
which the penalty applies so as to ‘be in line with’ international human rights 
standards.46  Significantly, both Viet Nam and Malaysia have discontinued the 
                                                            
the State under review, 6 March 2012, A/HRC/19/8/Add.1 at para 10 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand: 
Addendum’). 
41 First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam: Addendum, ibid. at para 20. See also, Report of the Working Group on 
the Universal Periodic Review: Myanmar: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, 
voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review, 27 May 2011,  A/HRC/17/9/Add.1 at 
para 9 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar:  Addendum’); First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, ibid. at 
para 87; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia: Addendum: Views on 
conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review, 
4 March 2014, A/HRC/25/10/Add.1 at 5 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum’); Second UPR: 
WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum, ibid. at 3. 
42 See, for example, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by the Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies.  Note by the Secretariat, 27 May 2008, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, Vol. I at 177-8. 
43 Report of the Working group on the Universal Periodic Review: United States of America: Addendum: Views 
on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under 
review, 8 March 2011, A/HRC/16/11/Add.11 at para 8. 
44 National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 
16/21: Malaysia, 6 August 2013, A/HRC/WG.6/17/MYS/1 at para 46 (‘Second UPR: Malaysia’s National 
Report’).  During its second UPR, Malaysia outlined its initiatives concerning in-depth research on the death 
penalty: Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at para 67.  See also, First UPR: WGP Report on 
Thailand: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 10. In a similar vein, Viet Nam said it would consider ratifying the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on the abolition of the death penalty ‘when conditions so allow’ although it had 
no ‘immediate plan’ to abolish it:  First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 20. 
45 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Viet Nam, 2 April 2014, A/HRC/26/6 at para 
59 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam’). 
46 First UPR: WGP Report on Laos: Addendum, supra n 39 at para 18. See also Report of the Working Group on 
the Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, 
voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review, 3 June 2009, A/HRC/11/30/Add.1 at 5 





application of the death penalty to minors.47  At the very least, it suggests that the 
approach of ASEAN States in this area is capable of evolving over time.   
At the same time, one has to acknowledge that there have been some 
regressive developments in this area.  For example, Brunei’s 2013 Sharia Penal 
Order not only extends the number of crimes to which the death penalty applies but 
also applies it to adultery and blasphemy which would not meet the requirements of 
international human rights law requiring the penalty to be imposed only for the most 
serious crimes.48 While Viet Nam has reduced the number of offences to which the 
death penalty applies, the actual number of individuals that have been sentenced to 
death has increased.49  Indonesia’s recent execution of six individuals for drug 
trafficking has also been heavily criticised not least because it suggests that there is 
little prospect of its moratorium on the death penalty being reinstated.50 All these 
events serve to illustrate the point that there can be setbacks and that human rights 
developments in ASEAN are not necessarily part of a ‘linear process’ of change.51  
The second category of disagreements relates to the extent to which ASEAN 
States are respecting human rights, such as the right to freedom of expression,52 
freedom of religion,53 and freedom of association. 54 In responding to these claims, 
ASEAN States asserted either that any restriction on or derogation from these rights 
                                                            
47 Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 41 at para 8; National report submitted in 
accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Viet Nam, 8 November 
2013, A/HRC/WG.6/18/VNM/1 at para 10 (‘Second UPR: Viet Nam’s National Report’).  
48 See, for example, Sweden’s assessment in this regard: Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review: Brunei Darussalam, 7 July 2014, A/HRC/27/11at para 103 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on 
Brunei’).  
49 Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 45 at para 122. 
50 ‘Indonesia’s death penalty for drug-related convictions “deplorable”, says HRW’, 18 January 2015, available 
at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/18/indonesia-s-death-penalty-drug-related-convictions-
deplorable-says-hrw.html [last accessed 19 February 2015].  
51 On the dynamics of change in the region: see, Kraft, ‘The Regionalization of Human Rights Norms in 
Southeast Asia’, Paper presented at Conference on ‘Beyond cultural relativism: The evolving human rights 
mechanism of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in context,  Swansea University, 21 March 
2014. 
52 See, for example, First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at paras 36, 44, 48 and 49;  Report of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Cambodia, 4 January 2010, A/HRC/13/4 at paras 30, 35, 43 
and 60 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Cambodia’);  Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Cambodia, 27 March 2014, A/HRC/26/16 at paras  29, 30, 55 and 56 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on 
Cambodia’); Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 15 June 2010, A/HRC/15/5 at paras 71, 82 and 86 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Laos’); First UPR: 
WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at paras 81 and 88; Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at 
paras 15, 30, 32, 54; First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at paras 35, 40, 64 and 82;  First UPR:  
WGP Report on Thailand, supra n 39 at paras 26, 28, 36, 37; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 39  
at paras 35, 45, 47, 63; Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 45 at paras 41, 50, 70, 71; First UPR: 
WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 at paras 62, 75.. 
53 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, ibid. at paras 36, 53, 39; First UPR: WGP Report on Laos:  
Addendum, supra n 39 at 2-8; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at paras 34, 76; Second UPR: 
WGP Report on Malaysia, ibid. at 44, 59; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, ibid. at paras 66, 81, 87; 
Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, ibid. at para 51; Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review: Indonesia, 5 July 2012, A/HRC/21/7 at paras 100, 97, 69 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on 
Indonesia’); First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, ibid. at para 35. 
54 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, ibid. at paras 36; Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, ibid. at 
paras 41, 70; First UPR: WGP Report on Cambodia, supra n 52 at paras 66-67; Second UPR: WGP Report on 
Cambodia, supra n 52 at paras 29, 30, 35, 36; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, ibid. at 81; First UPR: 
WGP Report on Myanmar, ibid. at paras 35, 64, 82; First UPR: Working WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 





was compatible with international human rights standards55 or denied the factual 
basis for the claim.56 ASEAN States did not contest the existence of the right but the 
assessment of whether a human rights violation had occurred in the light of all the 
relevant circumstances.  Here the difference of opinion relates as much to evidential 
issues as to normative ones. It demonstrates the real need for an independent 
oversight mechanism that can review whether the interference with the right is 
justifiable in the light of all the facts on the ground and whether the State’s approach 
remains within the limits laid down by international human rights standards.  Against 
this backdrop, the willingness of ASEAN States to agree to external scrutiny of their 
human rights record acquires a particular significance.  It can go some way to testing 
the validity of human rights restrictions and the legitimacy of claims made in the 
name of regional and national particularities.  
The final category is where the dialogue demonstrated a genuine difference of 
opinion over the content of human rights.  Malaysia and Singapore, two of the key 
proponents in the original Asian Values debate, were to the fore in these 
discussions. A particularly good illustration57 is the discussion that took place 
concerning the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) persons. In 
this area, there is a genuine difference of opinion over normative standards, notably 
concerning the right to respect for one’s private life and the principle of non-
discrimination.  Recommendations to decriminalize sexual relations between same 
sex couples and/or to prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation were 
rejected by Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore.58 In language reminiscent of the Asian 
Values debate, they based their rejection of these recommendations on religious 
beliefs, cultural traditions, national laws or conservative values within their national 
territory.59  It is important to observe, however, that even where ASEAN States 
departed from generally accepted international standards, this departure was not 
shared by all ASEAN States.60 Where ASEAN States departed from global 
                                                            
55 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Laos: Addendum, supra n 39 at paras 24-25; First UPR: WGP Report on 
Cambodia, ibid. at para 57; Second UPR: WGP Report on Cambodia, ibid. at paras 53, 91; First UPR: WGP 
Report on Malaysia, ibid. at paras 45, 52; Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 41at 6; 
Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, ibid at para 63; Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at 
para 66; First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, ibid. at paras 85; Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum, 
supra n 40 at 5; First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, ibid. at paras 84-86; First UPR: WGP Report on 
Thailand , supra n  39 at para 42. 
56 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia , ibid. at paras 46, 47; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, 
supra n 39 at paras 73, 75; Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, ibid at para 102; First UPR: WGP Report 
on Brunei: Addendum, ibid at 4; Second UPR: WGP Report on Cambodia , ibid. at paras 19, 20, 92; First UPR: 
WGP Report on Laos: Addendum, ibid. at para 26; First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at paras 
43, 97-98; First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 8; First UPR: WGP Report on 
Singapore, supra n 39 at para 99. 
57 Others include corporal punishment (Singapore insisted the practice was ‘within internationally accepted 
norms’: First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, ibid. at para 88). Malaysia took a similar position to Singapore 
on corporal punishment: Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 41 at para 8.  
58 See, First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at paras 84, 90(20); Second UPR: WGP Report on 
Brunei: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 3; First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, ibid. at para 82; First UPR: 
WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at para 48. 
59 See also, Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at para 9; Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei: 
Addendum, ibid. at para 3; First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 at para 82. 
60 See, eg, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: The Philippines, 9 July 2012, 
A/HRC/21/12 at para 94 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines’).  See also, Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Philippines: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or 
recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review, 19 September 2012, 





standards, they were more likely to be supported in doing so by non-ASEAN 
States.61  Indeed, Viet Nam in its recent UPR was commended for lifting the ban on 
same-sex marriage and promoting the rights of LGBT persons.62 At the very least, 
this calls into question any suggestion that there is a common approach to human 
rights within ASEAN States.   At the same time, one cannot dismiss the significance 
of the approach adopted by Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia in terms of the future 
development of LGBT rights at an ASEAN level given the enduring importance of the 
‘ASEAN Way’ and the resulting tendency to adopt a lowest common denominator 
approach to human rights within the Organisation. 
This brief overview of the dialogue during the first cycle of UPR suggests that 
care needs to be taken in evaluating the significance of disagreements between 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN States over human rights.  Not every difference of opinion 
is a challenge to the universality of human rights or a reflection of a distinctly Asian 
approach to human rights.  Clearly, there are still areas where there are important 
and deeply entrenched differences of opinion about particular human rights norms. It 
is significant, though, to observe the true magnitude of these differences of opinion 
and the fact that they are not always demarcated along ASEAN/non-ASEAN State 
lines. 
While the UPR process is still in its early stages, initial assessments are 
cautiously positive.63 In the present context, one important aspect of the process is 
that it may go some way to addressing the concerns raised by one proponent of 
Asia’s Different Standard about the Vienna Conference in 1993.  On that occasion, 
he argued that there was no real dialogue between Asian States and the West and 
no attempt to forge a meeting of minds between Asian and Western perceptions of 
human rights.64 By offering all States the opportunity to engage in an open-ended 
and constructive dialogue on human rights, engagement with the UPR process can 
help to create an environment where it may become possible to forge such a 
meeting of minds. In this regard, it is important to note Malaysia’s comment that 
following its first UPR ‘the government recognized that the development of civil and 
political rights in the country should keep pace with the significant progress made in 
economic, social and cultural rights’ and pointed to the ‘significant measures’ it had 
subsequently taken to enhance the exercise and enjoyment of civil and political 
rights in its country.65 While this is undoubtedly a positive development, its 
                                                            
that an Anti-Discrimination Bill that includes provisions addressing discrimination faced by LGBT individuals 
is pending in Congress.  
61 See, eg, the recommendations from Oman, Iran, Syria and Bangladesh to Brunei to strengthen or foster human 
rights in accordance with ‘its values and customs’: First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at 15.  See 
also, the recommendations from Kuwait, Iran, Oman and Morocco to Malaysia to continue to promote human 
rights in accordance with national values and ‘religious and cultural specificities’: First UPR: WGP Report on 
Malaysia, supra n  39at paras 74, 65, 31, 42. 
62 Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 45 at paras 90, 51,106. 
63 See, eg, Outcome of the Retreat of Algiers on the review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights 
Council, 19-21 February 2010  at 18-23; Summary Report, Open-ended seminar on the Review of the Human 
Rights Council, Montreux,  20 April 2010 at 7-9; available at:  
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/Seminaire_Alger.pdf and 
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/RapportMontreuxFinal.pdf. 
64 See, Kausikan, supra n 2 at 32. 
65 Second UPR: Malaysia’s National Report, supra n 44 at paras 89, 10. These measures included the annulment 
of three Emergency Proclamations, repealing the Internal Security Act 1960, repealing the Banishment Act 1959 
and repealing the Restricted Residence Act 1933.  Malaysia also stated that it had taken a number of measures 





significance is tempered by recent setbacks to the right to freedom of expression in 
Malaysia.66 It serves to reinforce the point that developments within the region are 
not linear and that they can be dictated by a range of factors not least the need to 
keep internal political constituencies on side.  At the same time, engagement with 
the process of UPR can at least help to keep open channels of communication and 
to exert some pressure, however limited, to ensure greater convergence with global 
human rights standards. 
The UPR dialogue can also serve a useful purpose in terms of tracking the 
current state of play concerning human rights within States not least because of the 
range and quality of information inputted into the process by UN bodies, civil society 
and a broad cross section of States.  What emerges from the UPR of ASEAN States 
is that while there are some positive trends there is also evidence of stalling and 
regression in relation to certain categories of rights. A recent example illustrates the 
point. During Brunei’s second UPR, concerns were raised about how the  
introduction of the Sharia Penal Code would impact the rights of women, freedom of 
religion, the right to life, freedom of expression, the right to equality of LGBT persons 
and the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.67  
While the recommendations issued at the conclusion of the UPR did not call for the 
wholesale abolition of the Code, they did call for the repeal of some of its sections or 
its postponement pending a review to ensure its compliance with international 
human rights standards.68  Nevertheless, all the recommendations were rejected.  In 
language reminiscent of the Asian Values debate, Brunei simply referred to the fact 
that the recommendations were contrary to its constitution, the official religion and/or 
its national legislation.69  It deflected queries and criticisms by reiterating its focus on 
‘the welfare of its people in addressing some of the core basic issues of human 
rights in terms of the rights to education, health, food and shelter’. 70 Omitting any 
reference to the importance of civil and political rights, Brunei referred to these four 
rights as the ‘four basic pillars of human rights’.71  It serves as a reminder, if one was 
needed, that the Asian Values debate retains some salience within a number of 
ASEAN States.  In light of the emphasis on consensus within ASEAN, this must be 
factored into any assessment of the operation of its existing human rights system as 
well as the prospects for its further development. 
 
(c) The UPR Recommendations: A Catalyst for Greater Convergence and 
Engagement with Global Human Rights Standards and Mechanisms? 
                                                            
rights that it had not accepted at that time. See also, its most recent UPR where it began by ‘reaffirming the 
value of the UPR process to Malaysia and its appreciation for the opportunity to engage in discussion and 
dialogue on developments in the human rights situation of the country’: Second UPR: WGP Report on 
Malaysia, supra n 39 at para 5. It ‘reaffirmed its commitment’ to a legal transformation agenda including the 
removal of legislative and other impediments to the enjoyment of ‘the full range of human rights’: ibid. at para 
64.  
66 Pak, ‘What is Malaysia’s sedition law?’, 27 November 2014, available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
29373164 [last accessed 29 January 2015]. 
67 Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 48 at paras 33, 34, 50,103. 
68 Ibid.at para 113. 
69 Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 3. 
70 Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 48 at 105.  






Of course it is possible to argue that the UPR dialogue, however constructive in tone, 
is simply political rhetoric if it is not translated into practice on the ground.  For this 
reason, it is important to examine the outcome of the UPR process.  At the 
conclusion of this process, the State under review has the freedom to accept or 
reject any recommendations made to it by States during the dialogue.  Reviewing the 
responses of ASEAN States to recommendations made during the first cycle of UPR 
reveals that the level of acceptance of these recommendations ranged from 37% 
through to 100%.  Specifically, individual acceptance rates72 were 37% (Brunei),73 
39% (Myanmar),74 60% (Malaysia),75 65% (Philippines),76 75% (Singapore),77 78% 
(Viet Nam),78 78% (Thailand),79 80% (Laos),80 86% (Indonesia)81 and 100% 
(Cambodia).82  This suggests a relatively positive level of engagement with the 
process by the majority of ASEAN States. It is also interesting to note that several 
ASEAN States have been commended during their second UPR for the positive 
measures they have taken to implement these recommendations.83  It highlights the 
fact that a human rights mechanism that is composed of representatives of Member 
States may have some capacity, however limited, to deliver tangible human rights 
outcomes.  This is a factor that is occasionally overlooked in discussions about the 
composition of AICHR and in various proposals for further institutional developments 
within ASEAN.   
                                                            
72 This is based on the recommendations listed in the UPR Working Group’s Reports.  
73 First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at paras 89-91; Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review: Brunei Darussalam: Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary 
commitments and replies presented by the State under review, 19 March 2010, A/HRC/13/14/Add.1 at 2-5 
(‘First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum’). 
74 First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at paras 104-107.  
75 First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at para 104; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: 
Addendum, supra n 46 at 2-8.   
76 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Philippines: Addendum: Views on 
conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review, 
25 August 2008, A/HRC/8/28/Add.1 at 2-3 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines: Addendum’). 
77 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Singapore: Addendum, 11 July 2011, 
A/HRC/18/11/Add.1 at paras 2-14 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore: Addendum’). 
78 Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 45 at para 6. 
79 First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand: Addendum, supra n 40 at paras 1-22. 
80 First UPR: WGP Report on Laos, supra n 52 at paras 96-99.  The recommendations were accepted completely 
or in part. 
81 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Indonesia, 14 May 2008, A/HRC/8/23 at 
paras 76-80 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia’). 
82 National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 
16/21: Cambodia, 21 November 2013, A/HRC/WG.6/18/KHM/1 at para 1 (‘Second UPR: Cambodia’s National 
Report’). During its subsequent review, it accepted 80%, rejected 2% and noted the remaining 
recommendations: Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Cambodia: Addendum: 
Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under 
review, 25 June 2014, A/HRC/26/16/Add.1 at 2 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on Cambodia: Addendum’). 
83 For example, Malaysia was commended for the action it had taken by Germany, Lebanon, Afghanistan and 
Bolivia: Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at paras 92, 107, 39, 52.  Brunei was also 
commended for the progress it had made in relation to the first UPR recommendations by Timor-Leste, Bhutan, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Romania, Malaysia, State of Palestine, Viet Nam, Belarus, the Philippines 
and Burkina Faso: Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 48 at paras 28, 36-38, 49, 51, 53, 78, 89, 93, 
101. Indonesia was commended for the implementation of some of the first UPR recommendations by Mexico: 





It is not enough to focus on the number of recommendations accepted, 
however. This is true where, as in the case of Singapore, some of the 
recommendations accepted simply exhort the State concerned to continue its 
existing efforts to enhance particular rights.84 It is difficult to attach too much 
significance to the level of acceptance of these types of recommendations given that 
they entail little if any cost for the State concerned. More important are those 
recommendations that require the State to take tangible and quantifiable action to 
protect and promote human rights.  For the most part, these recommendations can 
be organised thematically.  They relate, inter alia, to increased ratification of the core 
UN human rights treaties, removal of reservations to existing treaty commitments, 
greater State engagement with the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System, 
improved fact-finding, and enhanced national and regional human rights 
mechanisms.    
(i) UPR recommendations to ratify core human rights treaties: The 
prospects for greater convergence on human rights norms 
 
Ratification of the core UN human rights treaties can go some way towards 
addressing concerns about the normative and institutional gaps that currently exist 
within ASEAN’s human rights architecture.  Among ASEAN States at present, there 
is considerable variation in the level of ratifications of the core treaties.85 They range 
from Brunei which has ratified only two86 through to Cambodia which has ratified all 
bar one of the treaties.87 A considerable number of recommendations made to 
ASEAN States during the UPR process encouraged them to ratify the human rights 
treaties that they had not yet ratified.88  These recommendations elicited a range of 
responses.  All the ASEAN States indicated a willingness to ‘consider’ ratification of 
some of these treaties.89 Brunei, for example, stated that it was reviewing its position 
                                                            
84 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 at para 94. 
85 For ratifications, reservations and interpretive declarations to the core human rights treaties, see,  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en.  The core UN human rights treaties are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR); the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (CERD); the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW); the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT); 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC): the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (CRMW); 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD); the Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 2006, 2715 UNTS (CED). 
86 CEDAW and the CRC. All data concerning ratifications, etc are correct as at 24 November 2014. 
87 ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, CEDAW, CRC, CERD, CRPD and CED.   
88 See, First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at paras 46, 64, 67; First UPR: WGP Report on 
Cambodia, supra n 52 at para 82; First UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia, supra n 81 at paras 41, 52, 71; First 
UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at para 104; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia , supra n  39at 
paras 24, 64, 67, 70, 80-81; Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: The Philippines, 
23 May 2008, A/HRC/8/28 at paras 20, 46 (‘First UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines’); First UPR: WGP 
Report on Singapore, supra n 39 at paras 65, 68, 94; First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand, supra n 39 at para 
89; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 39 at paras 82-84, 89, 56. 
89 See, First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, ibid. at para 89; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia , ibid. at paras 
95, 104; Second UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia, supra n 53 at para 108; First UPR: WGP Report on Laos, 
supra n 52 at para 96; First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, ibid. at paras 103(f), 104; First UPR: WGP Report 





in relation to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) and one of the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC),90 while Malaysia stated that it was progressively studying proposals to 
ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT).91  They did not support specific recommendations calling for 
‘early’ ratification of these instruments, however.92 Other States, such as Indonesia, 
Thailand and Laos, refused to give their support to recommendations calling for the 
ratification of specific treaties.93 In these instances, it was explained by the need for 
the treaties in question to ‘be discussed by stakeholders’ at the national level,94 by 
the fact that treaty ratification raised major issues concerning the domestic legislative 
framework that needed to be resolved first,95 or because they were generally not 
ready to do so at that point in time due to resources and capacity to implement the 
obligations fully.96 It follows that while ASEAN States may be willing to consider 
further ratifications, they are equally keen to retain control over whether and when 
they do so.  Nevertheless, one cannot discount completely the potential significance 
of these responses. By indicating a commitment to consider further ratifications, they 
at least leave themselves open to being held to account for this commitment in 
subsequent UPR cycles and this is what has happened in practice.  While their 
hesitancy in committing to early ratification may be interpreted as a lack of 
commitment to global standards, arguably the situation is not so clear cut.  In some 
instances, it can be explained by the difficulty in ratifying treaties due to domestic 
constitutional principles or internal political constituencies; difficulties that are not 
unique to ASEAN States.97 
While agreeing to consider ratification may represent some progress, the 
crucial question is whether these commitments have been translated into practical 
action.  There are some positive developments in this respect.  Cambodia, for 
example, subsequently ratified the International Convention for the Protection of all 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED), the CRPD and the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and is currently examining ratification of Optional Protocols to the CRPD, 
                                                            
First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, ibid. at para 99; First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand: Addendum, supra 
n 40 at para 4; Second UPR: WGP Report on Cambodia, supra n 52 at 14. 
90 First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum, supra n 40 at 2.  
91 First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 46 at para 1. 
92 See, eg, Brunei which supported recommendations calling on it to ‘consider acceding to’ the core 
international human rights treaties to which it was not a party but did not support recommendations calling on it 
to ‘take early action’ to become a party to specific treaties such as the ICCPR and the ICESCR: First UPR: 
WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at paras 89-90.  
93 First UPR: WGP Report on Laos: Addendum, supra n 39 at paras 19-21, concerning the Optional Protocols to 
CAT, CEDAW, and CRPD; First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand: Addendum, supra n 40 at paras 5, 6 
concerning the CRMW, the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the CAT; Indonesia stated that 
it was unable to support recommendations to ratify the Optional Protocol to CRPD and the acceptance of the 
right of individual petition under the CRC: Second UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia: Addendum, supra n 40 at 
para 6.  
94 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Laos: Addendum, ibid. at para 20.  See also, Second UPR: WGP Report 
on Indonesia: Addendum, ibid. at para 6. 
95 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 46 at para 1; First UPR: WGP Report on 
Thailand: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 5. 
96 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar: Addendum, supra n 41 at para 3. 





the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).98   Indonesia, for its part, ratified the CRPD, the International Convention 
for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families 
(CRMW) and two Optional Protocols to the CRC while indicating its commitment to 
ratify the CED, the Optional Protocol to the CAT and the Optional Protocol to 
CEDAW. 99  In total, there have been 16 ratifications of the core international human 
rights treaties and Optional Protocols in the aftermath of the first UPR cycle.   They 
relate to the CAT,100 the Optional Protocol to the CAT,101 the CED,102 the CRPD,103 
the Optional Protocols to the CRC,104 the Optional Protocol to CEDAW,105 and the 
CRMW.106  In addition to this, Brunei recently stated that it would be ratifying the 
CRPD ‘in the near future’,107 Indonesia and Thailand have signed though not yet 
ratified the CED108 while Viet Nam has signed though not yet ratified the CAT.109  
ASEAN States have also indicated that they are studying the prospects of or are 
moving towards ratifying the ICCPR,110 ICESCR,111 the CED,112 the CERD,113 
                                                            
98 Second UPR: Cambodia’s National Report, supra n 82 at paras 5-6. 
99 Second UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia, supra n 53 at paras 9-11, 108. Since then, it has ratified the two 
optional protocols to the CRC: see, the list of Ratifications, Reservations and Declarations to the UN human 
rights treaties, available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
100 Laos ratified the CAT on 26 September 2012. 
101 Philippines ratified the OP-CAT on 17 April 2012. 
102 Cambodia ratified the CED on 27 June 2013.  
103 Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore ratified the CRPD on 20 December 2012, 30 
November 2011, 19 July 2010, 7 December 2011 and 18 July 2013 respectively. 
104Indonesia and Malaysia ratified the Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child in Armed Conflict (OP-
CRC-AC) on 24 September 2012 and 12 April 2012 respectively.  Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar ratified 
the Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, on Sale of Children, on Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography on 24 September 2012, 12 April 2012 and 16 January 2012 respectively. Thailand ratified the 
Optional Protocol allowing the right of individual petition on 25 September 2012. 
105 Cambodia ratified the Optional Protocol on 13 October 2010. 
106 Indonesia ratified it on 31 May 2012. 
107 Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 48 at para 22. 
108 Indonesia and Thailand signed it on 27 September 2010 and 9 January 2012 respectively. 
109 Viet Nam signed it on 7 November 2013. 
110  First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 46 at para 1. 
111 Malaysia noted that its Interagency Standing Committee on Human Rights was expected to conclude its work 
by the end of 2013 and submit its recommendations concerning accession to the ICESCR: Second UPR: 
Malaysia’s National Report, supra n 44 at para 43. 
112 Second UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines, supra n 60 at para 4. The bill is pending in Congress. Once it 
is enacted, the Philippines stated that it will study the possibility of ratifying the CED. See also, First UPR: 
WGP Report on Thailand: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 4; Second UPR: Viet Nam’s National Report, supra n 
47 at para 19. 
113 Singapore stated it would consider acceding to CERD although it has not done so to date: First UPR: WGP 
Report on Singapore: Addendum, supra n 77 at para 3. Malaysia stated that it had initiated several preliminary 





CAT,114 the CRMW,115 the CRPD,116 the first two Optional Protocols to the CRC117 
and the Optional Protocol to the CRPD.118   
While one cannot attribute these ratifications solely to the UPR mechanism, 
the process nevertheless can encourage or support pressures at the national level 
for the State to undertake a greater range of human rights obligations.  This is not 
unique to ASEAN States.  Indeed, one of the trends identified by the then UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in relation to the first cycle of UPR is that it 
contributed to a substantial increase in the number of ratifications of the core UN 
human rights treaties.119  In the present context, this is significant as an expansion of 
the human rights treaty commitments of the ASEAN States can help to generate a 
consensus on a wide range of human rights that are not formulated in abstract terms 
but in legally binding, relatively detailed terms and which establish clear 
requirements to be met when State wish to impose limitations on or to derogate from 
certain rights.  Not only this, but ratification brings with it increased accountability in 
terms of the need for the State to report to the relevant treaty body, which is 
composed of independent experts, on how it is complying with its human rights 
obligations.  When assessing the normative and institutional gaps concerning the 
protection of human rights within ASEAN, it is necessary to do so against the 
backdrop of the full range of human rights commitments undertaken by the ASEAN 
States including under these core UN human rights treaties.   
 
(ii) UPR recommendations to withdraw reservations to core human 
rights treaties: The evolution of Asia’s Different Standard? 
 
While the increased ratification of human rights treaties represents a positive 
development, it can be undermined by the State making reservations at the time of 
ratifying the treaty.  These reservations can operate to limit the application of the 
treaty at the national level.  Several preliminary observations can be made about the 
reservations made by ASEAN States.  In general, there are two broad categories of 
reservation made by ASEAN States.120  The first relates to the settlement of inter-
State disputes concerning the treaties.  Several ASEAN States have entered 
reservations precluding these disputes being referred to the International Court of 
                                                            
114 First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 46 at para 1. Viet Nam recently indicated its 
commitment to ratify the CAT: Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 45 at para 14. 
115 Second UPR: Viet Nam’s National Report, supra n 47 at para 19. 
116 Viet Nam recently indicated its commitment to ratifying the CRPD: Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, 
supra n 45 at para 14. 
117 Brunei stated that it was amending domestic legislation to enable it to ratify the OP-CRC-AC: National 
report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: 
Brunei Darussalam, 30 January 2014, A/HRC/WG.6/19/BRN/1 at para 13 (‘Second UPR: Brunei’s National 
Report’).  Singapore confirmed its intention to consider other instruments including OP-CRC-CP: First UPR: 
WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 at para 92. 
118 Second UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines: Addendum, supra n 60 at para 4. 
119 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty Body System, June 2012, at 17, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/TBStrengthening.aspx. 






Justice without the consent of the States concerned.121  It demonstrates a reluctance 
on the part of ASEAN States to submit to compulsory judicial settlement of disputes 
including those relating to human rights.  These reservations are relatively 
uncontentious and elicited no objections from the other State parties. Nevertheless, it 
is important to bear them in mind when considering the prospects for further 
development of ASEAN’s human rights system. At the very least, it calls into 
question the viability of establishing a regional human rights court for the foreseeable 
future.   
The second type of reservation by ASEAN States was far more contentious. 
These reservations purport to limit the application of the human rights treaty by 
stipulating that the rights contained therein are to be exercised in line with national 
laws, prevailing practices, customs, religion and/or policies within the State.122  The 
reservations made by Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore to CEDAW are a good 
illustration of this type of reservation.123  Essentially, these reservations stipulate 
either that the State is not bound by certain Articles in the Convention or that it is 
bound only insofar as the Convention does not conflict with Sharia or other religious 
laws.  This can be viewed as a very concrete illustration of cultural relativism albeit it 
is not one applicable to all ASEAN States and is certainly not confined to ASEAN 
States.  These reservations have elicited a considerable number of objections from 
other States.124   
 Against this backdrop, the second set of UPR recommendations is 
significant.  These recommendations call on Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia and Thailand to withdraw their reservations to human rights treaties or at 
least to keep them under review. In response, Brunei stated that it had held several 
discussions at the national level about its reservations to the CRC and CEDAW and 
that a detailed study was underway in relation to the CRC reservations.125 It 
subsequently reported that it was withdrawing some of its reservations to the 
CRC.126 While this was a promising development, the prospects for further 
withdrawals are remote given Brunei’s recent statement that it intends to retain its 
                                                            
121 Indonesia, Laos and Thailand in relation to CAT. Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam in 
relation to CEDAW. Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam in relation to CERD. 
122 Laos made a reservation concerning the right to freedom of association under the ICCPR which was objected 
to by Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands on the ground that the reservation was incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the ICCPR.  It also made a reservation to the CAT stipulating that the definition of torture is in 
accordance with national law which elicited objections from Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Thailand also refers to 
the concept of torture being defined in line with its penal code but talks about bringing its code more into line 
with CAT.  Notwithstanding this, its reservation was formally objected to by Sweden. Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand also made reservations/interpretive declarations to the CRC to the 
effect that the rights are to be exercised in line with national laws, prevailing practices, customs, religion and/or 
policies in the States concerned.  They elicited formal objections from Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Belgium, 
Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Denmark.  Malaysia entered a reservation to the 
CRPD which was objected to by Austria, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Singapore, Belgium and 
Sweden.  Thailand’s reservation to the CRPD to the effect that Article 18 was to be applied in line with national 
laws and practices elicited objections from the Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
123 See, supra n 120. 
124 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania., Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom all entered formal objections to Brunei’s reservation to CEDAW. Supra n 120. 
125 First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum, supra n 73 at 2. 





remaining and arguably most wide-ranging reservations.127 Malaysia, Laos and 
Singapore all undertook to review their reservations.128 Indonesia and Thailand went 
further with the former agreeing to remove all its reservations to the CRC129 while the 
latter made a voluntary pledge at the conclusion of its UPR to withdraw its 
reservation to Article 16 of CEDAW and to Article 18 of the CRPD as well as its 
interpretative declarations to Articles 6 and 9 of the ICCPR.130   
Parallel to the UPR process, these States are coming under sustained 
pressure from the UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies (TMBs)131 to 
withdraw these reservations.132  The TMBs are fairly pragmatic in the sense that they 
appreciate the domestic constraints on States concerning the removal of these 
reservations.  In the case of Singapore, for example, one TMB recognised that the 
pluralistic nature of its society and its history ‘call for sensitivity to cultural and 
religious values of different communities’.133 The TMBs accept the need for popular 
support for law reform albeit they are not prepared to let the States stand by and wait 
until such time as this support materialises.  For this reason, they have called on 
States including Malaysia to generate support for law reform through discussions 
and collaboration with religious and community leaders, civil society organizations 
and women’s NGOs.134 As is evident from recommendations to Singapore, whatever 
law reform process is undertaken it must be inclusive and allow for the effective 
participation of all the relevant stakeholders.135  In addition to this, the TMBs have 
called on Singapore and Malaysia to ‘study reforms in other countries with similar 
legal traditions’ with a view to ensuring that religious laws are compatible with global 
human rights standards.136 Singapore subsequently reported that it had implemented 
this recommendation by undertaking studies on comparative jurisprudence and 
                                                            
127 Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei: Addendum, supra n 40 at 3. 
128 First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at para 59 (Malaysia noted that a technical committee was 
in the process of recommending to the Government to withdraw its reservations to Articles 1 and 13 of the 
CRC).  It also stated that it ‘is progressively reviewing the reservations to CEDAW with a view to lifting them, 
taking into consideration the constitutional provisions, laws and national interests’: First UPR: WGP Report on 
Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 46 at para 1.  First UPR: WGP Report on Laos, supra n 52 at para 96. First UPR: 
WGP Report on Singapore: Addendum, supra n 77 at para 3  
129 First UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia, supra n 81 at para 76. 
130 First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand, supra n 39 at para 92. 
131 The TMBs are the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, the Committee Against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the 
Committee on Migrant Workers, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Committee 
on Enforced Disappearance which monitor and promote compliance with the ICCPR, the ICESCR, CERD, 
CEDAW, CAT, CRC, CRMW, CRPD, and CED respectively. 
132 See, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations regarding Thailand, 
15 November 2012, CERD/C/THA/CO/1-3 at para 7. See also, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations regarding Singapore, 16 January 2012, 
CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/4/Rev.1 at para 14. 
133 See, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
observations regarding Singapore, 2001, A/56/38(Supp) at para 74.  
134 See, eg, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
regarding Malaysia, 31 May 2006, CEDAW/C/MYS/CO/2 at para 14.   
135 See, eg, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
regarding Singapore, supra n 132 at para 16.  
136 See, eg, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding observations 
regarding Singapore, supra n 133 at para 74; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 





legislation of other countries particularly on gender and family law in Islam.137 
Malaysia, for its part, referred to the establishment of an inter-agency committee to 
coordinate implementation of the recommendations of CEDAW, policy and legislative 
amendments as well as awareness raising programmes.138  It seems that this 
combined pressure from the TMBs and the UPR process has had some effect.    
During the second cycle of UPR, Malaysia stated that it had progressively 
reviewed its position in accordance with Syariah and its Constitution resulting in its 
withdrawal of several reservations to CEDAW and the CRC.139  Singapore has 
partially withdrawn some of its reservations to CEDAW and is on record as stating 
that it is considering reviewing its position in relation to its other reservations to the 
Convention.140 While some reservations have been withdrawn, many important 
reservations remain.  Notwithstanding this, these developments141 merit reflection for 
several reasons.  They demonstrate how an evolving relationship with global human 
rights mechanisms can at least support developments at the national level to remove 
impediments to the recognition and application of human rights.  The interaction of 
ASEAN States with these global mechanisms combined with a myriad of factors on 
the ground will undoubtedly dictate the pace of any further withdrawals. However, 
the very fact that some reservations have been withdrawn demonstrates that 
religious and cultural traditions are not set in stone.   
 
 
(iii) UPR recommendations to increase State engagement with the 
UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Enhancing the prospects for 
greater convergence on the interpretation of global standards and 
greater external scrutiny of domestic human rights records? 
 
When a State ratifies a core UN human rights treaty, it agrees to engage in good 
faith with the monitoring system established under that treaty. Central to this 
monitoring system is the obligation on the State to submit reports at regular intervals 
to the relevant Treaty Monitoring Body (TMB)142 explaining how it is complying with 
its treaty obligations.  It must also engage in a constructive dialogue with the TMB, 
                                                            
137 First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 at para 48. 
138 Second UPR: Malaysia’s National Report, supra n 44 at paras 53-59. 
139 Ibid. at paras 39, 42. However, it recently stated that it had no plans to lift remaining reservations to the 
CRC, CEDAW and CRPD: Second UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 41 at para 10. 
140 Supra n 132 at para 6. 
141 Note Indonesia’s agreement to remove all its reservations to the CRC: First UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia, 
supra n 81 at para 76, and the removal of reservations by Viet Nam to the OP-CRC-AC: Compilation prepared 
by the OHCHR in accordance with paragraph 15(b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and 
paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21: Viet Nam, 7 November 2013, A/HRC/WG.6/18/VNM/2 
at 2 (‘Second UPR: OHCHR documents regarding Viet Nam’). Viet Nam has also accepted recommendations to 
remove its reservations to CERD: Report of the Working Group of the Universal Periodic Review: Viet Nam: 
Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by 
the State under review, 20 June 2014, A/HRC/26/6/Add.1 at 3 (‘Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam: 
Addendum’). 
142 That is, the TMB established under the treaty to which the State is a party.  Where the State has ratified 





following which the body issues its Concluding Observations and Recommendations 
to the States on the protection of rights within its jurisdiction. The nature and level of 
engagement between ASEAN States and the TMBs is significant for several 
reasons. The TMBs are composed of independent experts and can assist with 
rendering the State accountable for the way in which it interprets and applies human 
rights.143 The extent to which ASEAN States are willing to engage constructively with 
the TMBs can be a barometer of the extent to which they are willing to depart from 
the principle of national sovereignty over human rights issues. It can also provide 
useful insights into the relative value of legally binding obligations monitored by 
independent experts compared to soft law obligations monitored by State 
representatives in terms of delivering tangible human rights outcomes within ASEAN.   
Traditionally, the nature and level of engagement of some ASEAN States with 
the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System has been unsatisfactory with significant 
delays in the submission of State reports.  In the case of the Philippines, for 
example, there were extensive delays in the submission of its reports under the 
ICESCR, CERD and the CAT.144 In addition to this, the quality of the dialogue 
between some ASEAN States and the TMBs has been undermined by the presence 
of members of the States’ permanent Geneva delegations at the dialogue rather than 
representatives from the relevant ministries with the requisite knowledge and 
expertise to conduct a meaningful dialogue about human rights. More importantly, 
there has been a failure on the part of States to implement fully or at all the 
recommendations made by the TMBs at the conclusion of the process.145  It reveals 
a relatively uneven level of engagement and indeed actual disengagement on the 
part of some ASEAN States with this particular human rights mechanism. This 
undermines the extent to which these States can be held accountable for their 
actions in the human rights field and insulates them from pressures, however limited, 
that could be exerted at the global level to stimulate change. It also cautions against 
focussing simply on the number of treaty ratifications by ASEAN States.  Cambodia 
is a case in point.  Although it has ratified all bar one of the core international human 
rights treaties, in 2011 the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia observed that ‘many of 
the commitments undertaken by the government have not been more than paper 
exercises’.146   
For this reason, the third set of UPR recommendations is important as they 
call on States to enhance their engagement with the TMBs.147  In particular, they call 
on States to submit overdue reports to the relevant treaty bodies,148 thereby 
                                                            
143 See, eg, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations regarding Indonesia, 21 August 2013, 
CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1 at para 25, where it stated that, notwithstanding the decision of the Indonesian 
constitutional court upholding the State’s blasphemy law, the law was not compatible with the ICCPR. 
144 There were delays of more than 10 years in the submission of its reports under the ICESCR, CERD and 
CAT.   
145 See, eg, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding the Philippines, 22 
October 2009, CRC/C/PHL/CO/3-4 at para 9.  
146 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, 2 August 2011, 
A/HRC/18/46 at para 63. 
147 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at para 104; First UPR: WGP Report on the 
Philippines, supra n 88 at para 42; First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore: Addendum, supra n 77 at para 5; 
Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 48 at para 82; First UPR: WGP Report on Cambodia, supra n 52 
at 14. 
148 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Laos, supra n 52 at para 96; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra 





facilitating a resumption of dialogue between these States and the TMBs, and to 
implement the recommendations made by these bodies.149 It is still early days but 
there is evidence that some progress is being made.  To date, Cambodia,150 Laos, 
the Philippines,151 Malaysia,152 Brunei153 and Viet Nam154 have all submitted long 
overdue reports to the TMBs. There has also been a discernible shift, however 
gradual, in the approach adopted by States to the dialogue. By 2012, the TMBs were 
commending Cambodia,155 Laos,156 Singapore,157 Thailand158 and Viet Nam159 for 
sending high level delegations to the dialogue and engaging in an ‘open and 
frank’,160 and ‘constructive’161 dialogue with them. This is significant as the dialogue 
offers the possibility of encouraging greater convergence on the interpretation and 
application of rights between the global human rights mechanism and ASEAN 
States. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that it is not a uniform picture.  
While Myanmar accepted recommendations during the UPR process to ensure the 
effective implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2011,162 the 
following year the Committee on the Rights of the Child noted that most of its 
previous recommendations were insufficiently addressed or not addressed at all.163 
These developments demonstrate the evolving nature of the relationship 
between ASEAN States and the TMBs.  Although it is still early days, there is 
evidence of greater and more constructive engagement between some ASEAN 
States and the TMBs.  It signals a greater willingness to open up to external scrutiny 
including by States which traditionally played a prominent role in propounding Asian 
Values.  More generally, these developments show that binding legal obligations did 
not prevent the disengagement of ASEAN States with the TMBs for substantial 
periods of time.  As such, they sound a note of caution.  Binding legal obligations 
and human rights mechanisms composed of independent experts do not always 
                                                            
149 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at paras 75, 84; First UPR: WGP Report on 
Singapore: Addendum, supra n 77 at para 5. 
150 Second UPR: Cambodia’s National Report, supra n 82 at para 12. 
151 Compilation prepared by the OHCHR in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights 
Council Resolution 16/21, 30 March 2012, A/HRC/WG.6/13/PHL/2 at 4. 
152 Second UPR: Malaysia’s National Report, supra n 44 at para 41. 
153 Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 48 at para 22. 
154 Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 45 at para 15. 
155 See, eg, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
observations regarding Cambodia, 29 October 2013, CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/4-5 at para 3. 
156 See, eg, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 8 April 2011, CRC/C/LAO/CO/2 at para 2. 
157 See, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
observations regarding Singapore, supra n 132 at para 3. 
158 See, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations regarding Thailand, 
supra n 132 at para 3. 
159 See, eg, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Viet Nam, 22 August 
2012, CERD/C/VNM/CO/3-4 at para 2. 
160 See, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations regarding Thailand, 
supra n 132 at para 3. 
161 See, eg, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, supra n 156 at para 2; Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Concluding observations regarding Singapore, supra n 132 at para 3; Concluding observations regarding 
Cambodia, supra n 155 at para 2; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding 
observations regarding Vietnam, 16 April 2012, CERD/C.VNM/CO/10-14 at para 3.  
162 First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at para 104. 
163 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Myanmar, 14 March 2012, 





guarantee compliance with human rights standards.  Indeed, in relation to this third 
category of UPR recommendations, it could be said that an essentially consensual 
mechanism composed of State representatives demonstrated a somewhat greater 
capacity to deliver concrete human rights outcomes.   
 
(iv) UPR recommendations concerning Special Procedures: 
Enhancing the prospects of fact-finding with a view to clarifying 
the interpretation and implementation of human rights in a 
national context 
 
Aside from recommendations relating to the core human rights treaties, there were 
also recommendations relating to the system of Special Procedures which operate 
within the UN Charter-based System.  Widely regarded as one of the more effective 
global human rights mechanisms, these Special Procedures comprise independent 
Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups and Independent Experts who undertake in-
country fact finding visits, raise individual cases with States, convene expert 
consultations, contribute to the development of international standards, raise public 
awareness about these standards and report to the UN Human Rights Council.164 
The nature and level of engagement between ASEAN States and the Special 
Procedures is significant for a number of reasons.  On site fact-finding visits can 
provide valuable independent data concerning the human rights situation on the 
ground, test the validity of claims made in the name of national and regional 
particularities and, more generally, assist in rendering States accountable for any 
human rights violations.  Their ability to receive individual communications is also 
important given that AICHR currently has no mandate to do so and, in this respect, 
can go some way towards addressing one particular gap in the ASEAN human rights 
architecture.  Aside from this, the recommendations made by Special Procedures 
can, if implemented in good faith, help to enhance the level of rights protection within 
ASEAN States.   
Recommendations were made to ASEAN States to enhance their 
engagement with Special Procedures,165 specifically, to consider inviting them to 
undertake in-country fact-finding visits or to issue a standing invitation to them to 
undertake such visits.166  These recommendations were generally supported by 
ASEAN States167 although important variations appear in terms of the nature and 
extent of their willingness to do so.  While no ASEAN State rejected outright such 
                                                            
164 See further, the documents available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx. 
165 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at 15; Second UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra 
n 48 at 81; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 39 at paras 51, 55, 64, 83.  
166 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore: Addendum, supra n 77 at para 6; First UPR: WGP Report on 
Cambodia, supra n  52 at 14-15; First UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia , supra n 81 at para 63; First UPR: WGP 
Report on Laos, supra n 52 at para 96; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, supra n 39 at paras 75, 89; First 
UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines, supra n 88 at paras 20, 33; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, ibid. at 
paras 35, 47, 59, 61; First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand, supra n 39 at para 38. 
167 First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at para 82; Second UPR: Cambodia’s National Report, supra 
n 82 at para 14; First UPR: WGP Report on Laos, ibid. at para 96; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia, ibid. 
at para 11; First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at para 104; First UPR: WGP Report on the 
Philippines, supra n 88 at para 58; First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore: Addendum, supra n 77 at para 6; First 





recommendations, several were more willing to accept some Special Procedures 
rather than others.168 A second feature of the responses of ASEAN States was that 
they tended to prefer issuing ad hoc169 rather than standing invitations to the Special 
Procedures.170 Thailand, alone, was willing to issue a standing invitation to the 
Special Procedures to conduct in-country visits.171   
It seems that these recommendations have had some impact.  Viet Nam, for 
example, during its second UPR stated that it had accepted visits from five Special 
Rapporteurs,172 had a further one scheduled173 and had extended invitations to three 
others.174 Viet Nam’s experience is not unique.  Following the first cycle of UPR, 
Indonesia issued invitations to the Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression, 
Health, and Adequate Housing to conduct in-country visits175 while Malaysia had a 
visit by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and had agreed to visits by the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and the Special Rapporteur on the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Mental and Physical Health.176  These responses indicate a 
certain willingness on the part of some ASEAN States to undertake greater 
engagement with this global human rights mechanism including in the area of civil 
and political rights.177 It is questionable whether all the ASEAN States will take a 
similar approach.  To date, Brunei has not received any visit by a Special Procedure 
nor has it agreed to any178 although it is on record as welcoming requests for such 
visits.179 Clearly, there is a potential opening here that could be exploited by the 
                                                            
168 Singapore refused to support recommendations to accept visits by the Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights 
Defenders and on Extrajudicial Executions: First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 at para 97. 
Myanmar did not support recommendations to issue invitations to the Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of 
Displaced Persons, on the Right to Food, on Freedom of Religion and Belief, on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, and on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and Association: First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, ibid. at para 107. 
169 See, eg, First UPR: WGP Report on Brunei, supra n 39 at para 82; Second UPR: Cambodia’s National 
Report, supra n 82 at para 14; Second UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines: Addendum, supra n 60 at para 
4(h); First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore: Addendum, supra n 77 at para 6; First UPR: WGP Report on Viet 
Nam: Addendum, supra n 40 at para 19; First UPR: WGP Report on Malaysia , supra n 39 at para 11. 
170 Indonesia explicitly rejected the recommendation to issue standing invitations to Special Rapporteurs as did 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Viet Nam: see, First UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia, supra n 81 at 
para 59; First UPR: WGP Report on Laos: Addendum, supra n 39 at para 23; Second UPR: WGP Report on 
Malaysia: Addendum, supra n 41 at para 8;  First UPR: WGP Report on Myanmar, supra n 39 at 22; Second 
UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam: Addendum, supra n 141at 8; First UPR: WGP Report on Singapore, supra n 39 
at para 97.  
171 First UPR: WGP Report on Thailand, supra n 39 at para 94. 
172 The Special Rapporteurs on Minority Issues, Extreme Poverty, Impacts of Foreign Debt on Human Rights, 
the Right to Health Care, and Cultural Rights: Second UPR: WGP Report on Viet Nam, supra n 45at para 16. 
173 Ibid. (the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2014). 
174 Ibid.  
175 Second UPR: WGP Report on Indonesia, supra n 53  at para 14. 
176 Second UPR: Malaysia’s National Report, supra n 44 at paras 144, 145.  See also, the Philippines which 
issued an invitation to the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons: Second 
UPR: WGP Report on the Philippines, supra n 60 at para 90. 
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Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief during her visit’ to the country: First UPR: WGP Report 
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Special Procedures.  At the very least, by requesting invitations, the Special 
Procedures could test the good faith of States such as Brunei. 
Overall, there is evidence of a greater willingness on the part of some ASEAN 
States to open up to the level of independent, external review offered by the Special 
Procedures. The fact that this is happening at the global rather than the regional 
level perhaps is not surprising. The enduring significance of the ‘ASEAN Way’ of 
doing things means that a regional system of Special Procedures is unlikely to be 
established until such time as all ASEAN States agree to it.  Given that some of 
these States currently regard regional Special Procedures as too intrusive suggests 
that it may be some time before any such system is established.  In the meantime, 
the engagement of some ASEAN States with the global mechanism may at least 
have some ‘demonstration effect’ in the sense of potentially allaying the concerns of 
other ASEAN States about the adoption of a similar mechanism at the regional level. 
  
(v) UPR recommendations concerning national and regional human 
rights mechanisms: Enhancing the implementation of human 
rights on the ground and testing the true significance of national 
and regional particularities 
 
Recommendations were also directed towards strengthening the human rights 
infrastructure at the national and regional levels.180 These recommendations were 
generally supported by the ASEAN States.181 However, there was a certain 
resistance by Brunei, Laos, Singapore and Viet Nam to any attempt to stipulate the 
form that such infrastructure should take.  In particular, they were not prepared to 
support recommendations to establish a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) in 
line with the Paris Principles on the basis that other types of mechanisms could 
equally ensure the protection of human rights.182 Other ASEAN States were more 
willing to support these recommendations with Cambodia stating that it was working 
to expedite the establishment of a NHRI,183 while Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and 
the Philippines stated that they were strengthening their NHRI184  or ensuring that 
they were in line with international standards.185 To the extent that these 
commitments are translated into practice, these NHRIs can assist in ensuring that 
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any claims about the relevance of national or regional particularities are genuine and 
that their impact on the interpretation and application of human rights remain within 
the limits established by international human rights law.   
Other recommendations were directed to regional human rights mechanisms.  
For example, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand all accepted 
recommendations to enhance and strengthen the work of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).186 It demonstrates the 
potential for developments within one human rights regime to encourage or provide 
support for developments within other human rights regimes, in this instance at the 
national and regional levels. This is not confined to the UPR process.  Some of the 
recommendations emanating from the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System also 
call on ASEAN States to cooperate with ASEAN human rights mechanisms in the 
implementation of human rights within the region.187 It demonstrates the potential for 
positive engagement between these global human rights mechanisms and those 
currently emerging at the regional level within ASEAN. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION   
The changing nature and level of engagement between ASEAN States and the 
global human rights mechanisms is significant for several reasons.  It provides 
valuable insights into how these States deal with fundamental issues concerning the 
interpretation and implementation of global human rights norms.  It challenges the 
validity of claims that there is a uniform approach to human rights in the region, 
specifically one that embodies Asian Values or Asia’s Different Standard on human 
rights.  It helps to contextualise recent human rights developments within ASEAN 
and in doing so helps to facilitate a more measured assessment of the risks and 
opportunities associated with them. More generally, it cautions against broad 
generalizations about human rights in the region.   
At the outset, it is worth recalling that ASEAN States never refuted the 
concept of universality in its entirety.  Instead, some argued that the ‘hard core of 
rights that are truly universal is smaller than many in the West are wont to 
pretend’.188  For this reason, the increasing ratification of the core UN human rights 
treaties by ASEAN States is significant.  At the very least, it suggests that this hard 
core of rights is increasing in number and is set to increase further.  Several ASEAN 
States are currently taking action at the national level to facilitate further ratifications 
of these human rights treaties.  The fact that there have been 16 ratifications of core 
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human rights treaties in the short period of time since the first UPR process was 
undertaken merits reflection.  It demonstrates how global human rights mechanisms 
can help reinforce or support developments at the national level resulting in the 
ratification of a wider range of international human rights treaties.  It also 
demonstrates that the approach of ASEAN States is capable of evolving over time.   
The relationship between the ASEAN States and the global human rights 
mechanisms also casts some light on the true magnitude of the differences of 
opinion between ASEAN and non-ASEAN States on human rights norms. It is all too 
easy to portray controversies over human rights as further illustrations of Asian 
Values or a distinctly cultural relativist approach to human rights.  Experience within 
the global human rights mechanisms, specifically the UPR process, suggests the 
need for careful calibration of these controversies.  As discussions concerning the 
death penalty demonstrate, not every difference of opinion represents a challenge to 
the universality of human rights, particularly where no universal right currently exists.  
The UPR dialogue also demonstrates the need to consider not only the magnitude of 
the genuine differences that exist over normative issues but also the extent to which 
these differences are demarcated along ASEAN/non-ASEAN State lines.  
It must also be acknowledged that some of the controversies concerning 
human rights in ASEAN States stem from differences of opinion concerning the 
human rights situation on the ground and/or the extent to which the State’s 
restrictions on rights are permissible.  It demonstrates the nexus between procedural 
and substantive issues. Controversies surrounding the interpretation and application 
of human rights can be mitigated to a certain extent by the existence of effective 
oversight mechanisms that can ensure that any restrictions on human rights remain 
within the limits prescribed by international human rights law.  At present, there is 
some resistance within ASEAN to the creation of such mechanisms at the regional 
level.  As previously noted, proposals for a peer review mechanism or a Special 
Rapporteur for the region have been rejected as too intrusive. For this reason, the 
level of engagement between the ASEAN States and the Charter-based System, 
specifically UPR and the Special Procedures, takes on an added significance.  It can 
help to mitigate the effects of some of the institutional gaps that currently exist at the 
regional level to protect human rights.  Of course, one should not overstate the 
significance of these global mechanisms. At the very least, however, one should 
bear in mind that the human rights mechanisms currently being developed within 
ASEAN do not exist in isolation.  Their work in promoting human rights operates in 
tandem with these global human rights mechanisms as well as with national human 
rights mechanisms. 
To conclude, the approach of ASEAN States to human rights is one that 
eschews broad generalisations.  It cannot be captured accurately by references to 
Asian Values or Asia’s Different Standard on human rights.  As their engagement 
with the global human rights mechanisms demonstrates, the approach of ASEAN 
States is far more complex, heterogeneous and dynamic than such terms would 
suggest.  This merits reflection especially when considering the risks and 
opportunities associated with present and future human rights initiatives within 
ASEAN.  What also merits reflection is that such initiatives should not be viewed as 
though they exist in a vacuum.  They will always operate in conjunction with the 
complete range of human rights obligations undertaken by ASEAN States and the 





obligations.  Consequently, human rights developments within the region must be 
viewed in context.  As the nature and level of engagement between ASEAN States 
and the global human rights mechanisms demonstrate, it is important to recognize 
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